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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for resource curse
4 results foundAuthor: Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, ed. Title: Oil Curse, State instability, and violence in developing countries: theoretical lessons for Nigeria Summary: Oil production in Nigeria is often believed to bring economic failure, political instability, the inability to democratise, high levels of corruption, and violence in the form of rising crime, interstate wars, and internal conflicts. Such an assumption is quite prevalent amongst aid practitioners, journalists, activists, and some academics. Yet there are many exceptions in developing countries, and this paper empirically criticizes the 'resource curse' theory by focusing on the relationship between oil-producing states and war. It first examines contradictions and correlations that do not demonstrate causality. To escape economic determinism, it then suggests paying more attention to political contexts and historical timeframes, especially when authoritarian regimes existed before oil production. Sometimes, the oil rent can indeed exacerbate conflicts. But it is never a single cause. A quick reading of averages and correlations can be misleading in this regard. The conclusion thus calls for further qualitative investigation. Details: Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria: IFRA Nigeria, IFRA Institute of African Studies University of Ibadan, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: IFRA-Nigeria working papers series, no. 32: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://www.ifre.http://www.ifre.fr/c/1849fr/c/1849 Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 145820 Keywords: Natural Resources and Crime Oil Resource CurseViolence |
Author: Williams, Aled Title: At the extremes: Corruption in natural resource management revisited Summary: Natural resource sectors are undergoing profound changes. Resources are being extracted in more remote locations within corruption-prone developing countries than was previously the case; there is an increased proliferation of actors involved in resource extraction; and a marked shift towards renewable energy, conservation and climate change projects in developing countries. Formulating generic anti-corruption policy prescriptions for the wide range of heavily contextualised corruption challenges natural resource sectors face is unlikely to help. This U4 Brief offers instead modest advice for advancing solutions through development cooperation, with a focus on analytical methods, project management approaches, and tracking evidence for effectiveness. Details: Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Issue 2016:4), 2016. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2017 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/at-the-extremes-corruption-in-natural-resource-management-revisited/ Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/at-the-extremes-corruption-in-natural-resource-management-revisited/ Shelf Number: 145993 Keywords: CorruptionNatural ResourcesResource CurseTheft of Natural Resources |
Author: Courson, Elias Title: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta Summary: This Discussion Paper explores the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the context of a full-blown insurgency linked to local resistance and violence in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta. By focusing on MEND, an armed group that has been largely responsible for the escalation of the struggle by the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta into an armed phase since late 2005, the author draws attention to the roots, causes and complex dynamics underpinning the violent conflict and insecurity in the region. This study is both timely and important as it focuses on a festering local conflict that is of great significance to political stability in Nigeria's multi-ethnic federation, as well as to global energy security considering the high stakes involved as the region hosts Africa's most productive oil fields. The importance of this study lies in the ways it interrogates some of the existing perspectives to armed conflict in resource-rich contexts by providing a systematic analysis of the roots and drivers of violence in the Niger Delta. By examining the complex connections between the political economy of oil and the ways it has fed into the politics of dispossession, the history of ethnic minority agitation, resource control, and the vicious cycle of repression and insurgency, the author provides a good case study of the oil-conflict nexus in Nigeria. It also introduces some interesting perspectives to the linkages at the local-national-global levels in the conflict in the region. Although active in the Niger Delta the impact of MEND's attacks has been felt both nationally and globally. Attacks by MEND and other armed groups have led to the loss of a quarter of Nigeria's daily oil exports since 2006. This has adversely affected the revenue base of the Nigerian government, the profit margins of international oil companies operating in the region, and disrupted global oil supplies, contributing to rising prices in the volatile oil markets. Located in West Africa's oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, the Niger Delta is strategic to the energy security calculations of the world's established and emerging powers: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and India. For this reason, the crisis in the Niger Delta has attracted a lot of international attention and concern underscoring both the high stakes involved and the importance of ending the conflict and building sustainable peace in the region. MEND's propaganda machinery has also been active at the national and global levels in seeking attention for its local course. By focusing on MEND, this study casts more light on its origins, methods, strategies and objectives. It also nuances some of the more complex aspects of the conflicts in the oil-rich region, providing to some extent a basis for understanding some of the contradictions and ambivalence within MEND itself, and other actors, local and international involved in the conflict. Beyond this, it provides a sound basis for grappling with the challenge of resolving the complex conflict, starting with a review of some of the more recent efforts of various Nigerian governments, and calling attention to the need to tackle the problem from its roots. The analysis and material contained in this Discussion Paper should be of interest to scholars of conflict and peace in Africa, strategic and energy analysts, as well as policy makers working in the fields of democracy and development on the continent. Details: Uppsala: Nordiska AfrikainstitutetT, 2009. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion paper 47: Accessed June 22, 2017 at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112097/47.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112097/47.pdf Shelf Number: 146340 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOil IndustryOil-Conflict NexusPetroleum IndustryResource CurseViolence |
Author: Chikwanha, Annie Barbara Title: Combating Corruption in the Extractive Industry in Africa Summary: Introduction The 2014 report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial flows in Africa, chaired by Thabo Mbeki (known as the Mbeki Panel), has drawn attention to the urgent need to strengthen African efforts to fight corruption and combat illicit financial flows from the region. Anti-corruption efforts by the African Union (AU) member states have been floundering for a number of reasons, including lack of regulatory and enforcement capacity. The quality of the regulatory and institutional frameworks in Africa presents a formidable challenge to reforming the extractive industry in order to achieve transparency and accountability. The state of public services' governance regimes in most of the continent's countries affects the implementation of reforms, while enforcement of laws is greatly discouraged by rent-seeking behaviour, which is even more pronounced in extractive-sector investments. These issues, together with sophisticated private-sector-induced corruption, mean that national extractive systems fail to design and implement reforms that would minimise corruption. Oversight institutions also lack capacity and independence. Overall, prosecuting systems are not autonomous, under-resourced, and lack the skills and infrastructure needed to combat corruption. As more natural resources are found in Africa, rent-seeking bureaucratic tendencies continue to result in the transfer of wealth from the economy to a few political elites, perpetuating the label of the resource curse. Corruption in the extractive sector (oil, gas and mining) has a clear supply side: the extractive companies, and an equally clear demand side: the bureaucrats and politicians. This makes it essential to use a definition of corruption that captures both sides of the divide. The ‘circumventing of formally agreed or implicit rules for decision making (in the public or private sector), or the use of personal inducements to achieve institutional and/or personal objectives,' aptly captures the various dimensions of corruption in the extractive industry and gives indications of possible corrective measures. Irrespective of the natural resource under scrutiny, the extractive sector's value chains, from extraction to utilisation of the revenues, and the institutional and policy frameworks for each mineral's value chain are riddled with corruption challenges. The nature of the resource determines the actors that dominate that specific product market and these, in turn, determine the types of corruption that emerge. In the African oil sector, for example, big conglomerates and state-owned enterprises dominate the market and deal directly with senior-level politicians. 'High oil revenues in Africa are associated with poor governance, lack of economic and social development, lack of respect for basic human rights and increased poverty' in the midst of abundance. The incipient gas sector appears to be following a similar trend. ‘Emerging developments in the gas and oil sectors in East African countries, such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Madagascar,' could become a testing ground for strengthening the Mbeki Panel's recommendations on anti-corruption mechanisms in the gas extractive regime. In mining, there are many actors (research, extraction, refining, designing, marketing) and multiple layers of trading networks involved (miners, middlemen, exporters), and this again varies from mineral to mineral and country to country. New entrants to the African market, such as the Chinese, tend to deal at a political level with top officials in all their investment ventures. This effectively sidelines public institutions, such as investment centres and relevant ministries, when negotiating for mining rights. The contribution of revenues from mineral resources to national development in African governments is affected by their vulnerability to tax-evasion practices. These fraudulent acts are a symptom of the low institutional capacity to enforce tax compliance. In South Africa, where there are big corporations, the kind of corruption that triggers illicit financial flows is highly sophisticated. Driven by rich multinational corporations and wealthy individuals with the capacity to do sophisticated tax planning, illicit financial flows result in complex transfer pricing and trade under-invoicing. For instance, in developing countries, oil companies tend to do the accounting for tax payments, rather than governments, because of their capacity. In the absence of stringent auditing measures by governments, opportunities for manipulation therefore arise. Where artisanal miners dominate, as is the case in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), chains of middlemen dominate the industry, and complex webs that involve politicians and public officials are the norm across all mineral markets. At the regional level, ‘The plethora of African institutions mandated with curbing corruption have largely failed due to poor institutional capacity and the lack of political will in domesticating and implementing anti-corruption protocols. Instead, many of these institutions have remained inward servicing as they struggle with capacity constraints.' A good example is the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC), which since its inception has largely concentrated on getting the rules and procedures of the work of the board in place, and has clearly failed to initiate any substantive work on the implementation of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), which was adopted in July 2003. A major criticism levelled against all anti-corruption institutions in the continent is the preoccupation with 'grand' corruption. Administrative corruption, which affects the majority of the poor, however, does not get as much attention – yet it is core to the creation of equitable opportunities, which would enable all to benefit from the effective use of public resources. 'There is a need to strengthen provisions in the national codes of conduct for institutions that provide public goods and services and, more importantly, to ensure enforcement and compliance.' Boyce and Ndikumana’s study on illicit financial flows in 33 sub-Saharan African countries estimated capital flight in the region to be around US$505.4 billion for the period 1970–2010.10 Net trade misinvoicing contributed an additional US$204.8 billion to total capital flight, and unrecorded remittances US$104 billion. African states have been struggling to institutionalise their anticorruption infrastructure and have not complied with agreed-on regional or international standards. Active domestication of anti-corruption protocols compels countries to take steps to ensure that their commitments are reflected in national legislation and regulation, but this requirement is also wanting. Although 34 countries have ratified the AUCPCC, reviewing and reporting on the protocol implementation remain sluggish. The instruments for reporting are not fully developed and there is neither a system nor the capacity to engage with the substantive content of member state reports. This report identifies the corruption challenges that African countries face in their extractive value chains and attempts to give recommendations for entry points for external actors in supporting capacity building to deter corruption and illicit financial flows. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 10, 2019 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/iss-sida-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/combating-corruption-in-the-extractive-industry-in-africa Shelf Number: 154128 Keywords: Administrative Corruption African Union Advisory Board on Corruption Corruption Extractive Sector Illicit Financial Flows Mbeki Panel Oil Sector Regulatory Agencies Resource Curse |